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1. Introduction
Consider a market in which a consumer needs a treatment for a problem (e.g., a medical con-
dition) from an expert (e.g., a physician). The problem is either minor or major, and there
can be two potential treatments. The expert has private information about which treatment is
appropriate for the consumer. Given his information advantage, the expert may recommend to
and provide the consumer with the “wrong” treatment—a major treatment for a minor problem
(overtreatment) or a minor treatment for a major problem (undertreatment)—if doing so in-
creases his payoff. An extensive literature has analyzed this adverse selection problem in expert
markets, where the good or service provided by the expert is sometimes called a credence good.1
A prominent result from this literature is that equal price margin for the two treatments restores
efficiency under adverse selection: the expert will recommend the appropriate treatment if he is
made indifferent in his payoff between the two alternatives.
In many situations, the expert may need to exert costly effort to determine the consumer’s
problem and the type of treatment that is appropriate. For example, a patient with a bad cough
and a fever may need only a minor treatment (home rest, possibly with some medication) or a
major treatment that requires hospitalization, and the physician may need to exert diagnosis
effort—such as spending more time with the patient, investigating related symptoms—to deter-
mine which treatment is appropriate.2 To the extent that (some of) the diagnosis effort and its
cost are the expert’s private information, the expert may not exert it even when doing so is so-
cially desirable. This moral hazard problem, which has been largely ignored in the literature on
credence goods,3 can lead to additional market inefficiencies. In particular, while the equal price
margin condition can remove the distortion due to adverse selection, it may also eliminate the
incentive for the expert to exert effort to find out the appropriate treatment for the consumer.
1See, e.g., Darby and Karni (1973), Taylor (1995), Emons (1997, 2001), Fong (2005), and Alger and Salanie
(2006). Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006) review the literature on credence goods in a unified framework.
2Alternatively, the expert service could be to repair a consumer’s car, to fix a client’s malfunctioning air-
conditioning system, to provide advice on a client’s legal problem, or to improve the security of a client’s computer
network. In all these situations, the expert may need to be provided with incentives both to incur (private)
diagnosis cost and to report the consumer’s problem honestly.
3Exceptions include Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2009) that investigates the incentives of experts to exert di-
agnostic effort and to report truthfully when the experts face competition from discounters who cannot perform
diagnosis; and Bester and Dahm (2017) that analyzes the design of optimal contract when payment can be made
contingent upon the consumer’s report of her subjective evaluation of the treatment outcome in a combined model
of adverse selection and moral hazard.
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In this paper, we investigate the potential role of liability in disciplining the expert’s behavior
in a model with both adverse selection and moral hazard that captures the market environment
as described above.4 The consumer requires either a major or minor treatment depending on
her (problem) type. Upon seeing the consumer, the expert either immediately learns—with his
expertise—which treatment is appropriate, or can exert (additional) private effort to obtain this
information. The type of treatment the expert provides is observed publicly but the outcome
of treatment (thus whether the provided treatment is appropriate or not) is verifiable only with
some probability. If the consumer suffers from a wrong treatment, there is some probability
that the consumer can discover and verify the loss, in which case the expert is required to
compensate the consumer according to some liability rule that is a function of the losses from
mistreatments.5
We consider an environment where the prices for the two treatments are set to maximize
consumer surplus, subject to a minimum-price condition that ensures each treatment to receive
non-negative profit under the prior belief about the consume type.6 We find that for a wide range
of liability rules, the equilibrium prices are such that the expert will receive the same expected
profit—taking into account the expected liability cost—from the two treatments under the prior
belief. The price margins for the two treatments generally differ, but they are close enough
to compel the expert to prescribe the appropriate treatment based on his best information.
Remarkably, here the “equal price margin” condition is no longer necessary to solve the adverse
selection problem, because the presence of liability relaxes the incentive constraint for the expert
to reveal his private information truthfully. In fact, the familiar result that price margins are
equalized for the two treatments emerges in equilibrium as a special case of our model under
zero liability.
4Bardey, et al (2018) analyze a market for experience goods that also combine both adverse selection and
moral hazard. They study optimal regulation and to what extent competition can substitute for regulation to
curb the distortions from these two problems. On the other hand, our paper studies liability design in markets
that share features of a credence good.
5By contrast, the literature on credence goods assumes that consumers are unable to learn whether appropriate
treatments have been provided, at least in the case of overtreatment which, by assumption, solves the consumer’s
problem (e.g., Emons,1997, 2001; Fong, 2005; Dulleck and Kerschbamer, 2006). Hence, the literature considers
either infinite liability (for undertreatment) or zero liability (for overtreatment).
6What we have in mind are situations where either there are many potential experts competing in prices to
serve the consumer or the consumer is able to make price offers; however, there is friction in competition among
potential experts, or the consumer has limited power to commit to her price offers. Hence the expert retains the
power to maintain certain minimum prices.
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While there are many liability rules under which the expert will recommend honestly about
the appropriate treatment given his private information, they generally do not provide the
incentive for the expert to exert efficient diagnosis effort. We show that there exists a particular
liability rule, together with the equilibrium prices it induces, that leads to efficient diagnosis
effort and honest information reporting. The efficient liability rule specifies a damage payment
for a verified loss—contingent on whether the loss is due to overtreatment or undertreatment and
the probabilities that losses are verifiable—that equates the price margin for each treatment to
the efficient critical value of the expert’s diagnosis cost.7 Then, the expert will incur the (extra)
diagnosis cost if and only if the cost does not exceed the expected social benefit; and he will also
choose the efficient treatment—the treatment that maximizes the expected total surplus—based
on his information.
We further analyze our model without imposing the minimum-price constraint. We interpret
this as there being unfettered competition between (potential) experts in the expert market,
which maximizes consumer surplus. We show that if the expert can choose not to treat the
consumer after seeing her (and also not to receive any payment), a situation that we term as
“no obligation to serve”, then it is possible that no liability rule can attain full efficiency. In this
sense, increased competition in the expert market may reduce market efficiency. However, if the
expert has the obligation to serve (i.e., he must treat the consumer after seeing her even when
the realization of his diagnosis cost is very high), then there exists an efficient liability rule that
restores full market efficiency.
Our finding that unfettered competition in expert markets can undermine efficiency may seem
puzzling. If there exists a liability rule that induces the efficient outcome when competition is
constrained by the minimum-price condition, why cannot an alternative liability rule ensure the
efficient outcome when competition is unconstrained? The key to understanding this result is
to recognize that when the consumer may be (partially) compensated through liability for her
loss from a “wrong” treatment, she does not fully internalize the social cost of such a loss. The
prices that maximize consumer surplus may thus be too low to provide efficient incentive for
the expert to exert diagnosis effort. Consequently, the efficient role of liability is undermined
7Undertreatment and overtreatment may cause different amounts of harm to consumers, and overtreatment is
generally believed to be more difficult to verify than undertreatment.
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without the minimum-price constraint. Our analysis will illuminate such subtlety in the optimal
design of liability.
The economic analysis of liability goes back to the seminal contributions by Brown (1973)
and Shavell (1980). In markets where consumers can detect and verify a product’s failure,
the literature has studied how product liability rules affect a producer’s incentives to improve
product safety ex ante and to provide ex post remedy for an unsafe product (e.g., Daughety and
Reinganum, 1995, 2008; Spier, 2011; Hua, 2011; Chen and Hua, 2012). See also Shavel (2007) for
a survey on the analysis of liabilities for accidents. In credence goods markets where consumers
are assumed to rely on experts to determine which treatment is appropriate, not much attention
has been devoted to the role of liability in motivating the experts’ effort and honesty, presumably
because of the view that if consumers cannot tell whether or not a treatment is appropriate,
liability would not be effective as an incentive mechanism.8 Our departure is to recognize that
while a consumer may lack the expertise to know the right treatment, with some probability
she can learn and verify her loss from a wrong treatment, possibly from the expertise of other
experts, as for instance in the case of medical malpractice.9
While our model applies to markets with expert services in general, perhaps its most promi-
nent application is the health care market where physicians’ incentives are regulated by medical
malpractice liabilities (e.g., Danzon, 1991).10 Studies suggest that 4 to 18 percent of patients
seeking care in hospitals in the U.S. are victims of medical malpractice, which could cost be-
tween $17-29 billion per year ( e.g., Arlen, 2013). Liability for medical malpractice has emerged
to discipline physicians and protect patients, but its performance has been controversial, and
studies on its optimal design are scarce.11 Our analysis sheds light in this regard. In particu-
8There have been studies under specific settings, as, for instance, Fong and Liu (2018) who considers how
liability may affect the expert’s incentive to maintain reputation in a model of adverse selection. Also related is
Fong, Liu, and Wright (2014), which emphasizes the importance of verifiability.
9Our model can be considered as one of credence goods, although it differs from what is usually assumed for
“pure” credence goods. The product in our model also differs from an experience good, the quality of which
is fully revealed after consumption. Our assumption that the quality can be learned ex post only with some
probability seems to better reflect reality in expert markets.
10There is abundant evidence showing that physicians respond to financial incentives in treatment choices.
Gruber, Kim and Mayzlin (1999) finds that cesarean deliveries are more common if they are highly reimbursed
relative to normal deliveries. Dickstein (2016) finds that capitated physicians tend to choose drugs that require
fewer follow-up visits when treating depression. Using a large set of private health insurance claims, Coey (2015)
finds that physicians’ treatment choices in heart attack management respond to the payments they receive, and
the response is quite large.
11As two important exceptions, Simon (1982) compares the performance of negligence rule with strict liability
in the health care market, and points out the need for strict liability to motivate physicians to exert proper care
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lar, our results suggest that malpractice liability is essential for motivating physicians to exert
proper diagnosis efforts. The efficient liability level depends not only on the magnitude of the
loss, but also on whether there is overtreatment or undertreatment, because their probabilities
of detection often differ. Also, the efficient liability is sometimes punitive, (much) exceeding
the patient’s loss from a malpractice incident. Finally, it may not be efficient to give all the
bargaining power to the consumer—or the health insurance company on her behalf—in setting
prices for the services: without the minimum-price constraint that ensures non-negative profit
for each treatment under prior belief, an efficient liability rule may fail to exist.
In the rest of the paper, we describe our model in section 2. Section 3 conducts the analysis
under the assumption of a minimum-price constraint and presents our main results. In section
4, we analyze our model without assuming the minimum-price constraint. Section 5 concludes.
Appendix A contains proofs for Propositions 1 and 3. Appendix B extends our analysis to a
setting where diagnosis effort generates only a noisy signal about the consumer’s problem and
demonstrates that, under the minimum-price constraint, an efficient liability rule continues to
exist if the signal is sufficiently informative.
2. The Model
A consumer needs a treatment from an expert for a problem that can be either minor or major,
t ∈ {m,M} , where
Pr (t = m) = θ = 1− Pr (t =M) ∈ (0, 1) . (1)
The expert can provide two types of treatments, a minor treatment Tm or a major treatment
TM , which is appropriate if the consumer’s problem is respectively m or M . If the problem
is not treated, the consumer suffers a loss xt for t ∈ {M,m}, with her expected loss without
treatment being
x ≡ θxm + (1− θ)xM . (2)
to avoid inadvertent events; Arlen and MacLeod (2005) analyzes optimal liability in a model where the physician
invests in expertise and the concern is inadequate treatment (but not overtreatment). The key conflict in both
papers is a moral hazard problem. By contrast, in our model there are both moral hazard and adverse selection.
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If the consumer receives a treatment from the expert, the consumer’s gross utility, which depends
on her type (t) and the treatment she receives, is
v (t, T ) =


0 if t = m and T = Tm or t =M and T = TM
−zu if t =M and T = Tm
−zo if t = m and T = TM
. (3)
Thus, the consumer’s gross utility is normalized to zero if she receives the appropriate treatment
for her problem. If her type is M but the treatment is Tm, undertreatment occurs and the
consumer suffers a loss zu > 0. On the other hand, overtreatment occurs when problem type
m is treated with TM , in which case the harm to the consumer is zo > 0.
12 We further assume
that the consumer is able to verify her loss zu with probability αu ∈ (0, 1] when undertreatment
has occurred, and to verify her loss zo with probability αo ∈ (0, 1] when overtreatment has
occurred.13
Note that the way we define consumer’s utility differs from that in the credence goods
literature, where the harm from overtreatment is usually normalized to zero, and undertreatment
leads to the same utility as no treatment. (See, e.g. Emons, 1997; Dulleck and Kerschbamer,
2006). We depart from this modeling by assuming that overtreatment also leads to a harm
for the consumer (we could allow zo = 0 as a special case) and undertreatment may lead to a
loss different from no treatment (with the two being equal as a special case). By adopting this
more general setup, we wish to explicitly account for the increasing concern over the harm from
overtreatment in practice (e.g., Brownlee, 2008; Buck, 2013, 2015).14
The expert is better informed about the nature of the consumer’s problem, and, if necessary,
can exert extra efforts to diagnose the problem. Specifically, we assume that upon seeing the
12Our analysis and results would be essentially the same if we interpret zu and zo as the expected losses
associated with undertreatment and overtreatment.
13It is difficult but not impossible to verify overtreatment in practice. In health care markets, overtreatment
cases may center on the medical necessity of a procedure. For example, Dignity Health pays $37 million in
False Claims Action, entering a settlement for improper and medically unnecessary hospital admissions. (Modern
Healthcare, Oct. 30, 2014)
14Buck (2015) reported that John Dempsey Hospital was discovered in 2011 to administer chest combination
CT scans at nearly 10 times the national average while health experts noted that combination scans do not provide
more valuable information in comparison to a single CT scan in most of those situations. Excess combination
scans subject patients to clearly identifiable harm: exposing them to large doses of radiation which increases the
risk of developing cancer at later stage.
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consumer, with probability β ∈ [0, 1) the expert is informed about the realization of t (i.e.,
whether t = m or M), while with probability 1− β he is not informed of t but privately learns
the realization of k, his private cost for exerting some additional diagnosis effort to learn the
realization of t.15 Ex ante, k follows a continuous probability distribution F (k) on support[
0, k¯
]
, with k¯ > 0 . We denote the expert’s decision on whether to incur k—if he does not
observe the realization of t upon seeing the consumer—by e ∈ {E,N} . If he chooses E by
incurring k, the expert learns the realization of t, while if e = N (i.e., incurring no k) the expert
maintains his prior belief about t. Whether the expert incurs the diagnosis cost is his private
information.
Treatments Tm and TM cost the expert 0 and C > 0, respectively, and we assume
(i) C + θzo < x, and (ii) C < zu(1− θ), (4)
so that (i) applying a major treatment without knowing whether t = m or M is more efficient
than leaving the problem untreated, and (ii) without knowing whether t = m or M , there exist
parameter values under which TM is more efficient than Tm. The type of treatment provided
to the consumer—e.g., whether a certain procedure is carried out—is assumed to be publicly
observed. Thus, if the expert recommends treatment TM , cost C must be incurred to implement
the treatment.
The expert may be liable for a bad outcome that is a result of maltreatment. The liability
rule specifies damage payments D ≡ (Do,Du), so that the expert is required to pay Du > 0 if
it is verified that the consumer has received undertreatment with loss zu, and he is required to
pay Do > 0 if it is verified that the consumer has received overtreatment with loss zo.
16
Let PM and Pm be the prices for treatments TM and Tm, respectively. The timing of the
game, given a liability rule D, proceeds as follows:
1. The consumer sets prices (PM , Pm), possibly subject to certain constraint. [Equivalently,
15This effort is beyond the observable normal effort associated with seeing the consumer. The extra cost k may
include the additional time the expert spends with the consumer, the effort to gather additional information or
to learn new developments in treatment technology.
16In the existing literature on credence goods, the assumption of “liability” refers to the requirement that the
expert fixes the consumer’s problem, which is equivalent to unlimited liability for undertreatment (Du = +∞).
This, together with the assumption zo = 0, deters undertreatment. Our more general formulation allows us to
analyse the impact of different levels of liabilities on the expert’s behavior and the efficient liability rule.
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(at least two) potential experts compete in prices, possibly under some market friction, to
provide each treatment and one expert is chosen by the consumer.]17
2. Upon seeing the consumer, the expert either learns the realization of t and chooses T ∈
{Tm, TM} , or, without learning t, he learns the realizations of his private diagnosis cost
k. The expert then chooses whether to exert diagnosis effort (if it is needed) and the type
of treatment to propose to the consumer.
3. The treatment recommended by the expert is implemented and payment (PM or Pm) is
made.
4. If a loss from treatment is verified, the expert compensates the consumer an amount
according to the liability rule D.
Notice that there are potentially four dimensions of asymmetric information in our model:
the expert’s private information about (i) whether he learns the realization of t upon seeing the
consumer, (ii) the realization of k, (iii) whether he incurs the diagnosis cost, and (iv) whether
t = m or M , with or without incurring k.
3. Analysis
In this section, we first describe the efficient benchmark, then characterize the equilibrium of
the game between the expert and the consumer, and finally characterize the liability rule that
implements the efficient outcome.
3.1 Efficient Benchmark
Suppose all information is public and the expert can be required to act efficiently in all possible
situations. If the expert learns t upon seeing the consumer, it is clearly efficient for him to
choose Tt for t = m,M. So we focus on the case where the expert needs to incur k in order to
learn t. The total surplus of the expert and the consumer, from strategy (N,TM ) (implementing
TM without incurring diagnosis cost k) or from strategy (N,Tm) (implementing Tm without
17Arlen and MacLeod (2005) analyze a setting in which the patients are price setters while the physician market
is fully competitive.
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incurring cost k), is respectively
W (N,TM ) = −θzo − C; W (N,Tm) = −(1− θ)zu. (5)
Following action E, the efficient choice for the expert is Tt for t = m,M . This strategy, denoted
as ET , leads to total surplus
W (ET ) = −k − (1− θ)C.
By the assumption on C from part (i) of (4),
W (N,TM ) = −θzo − C > −x,
so that if the expert has no additional information about t beyond his prior belief, a major
treatment is better than no treatment. Moreover, W (N,TM ) ≥W (N,Tm) if and only if
zo ≤ zu(1− θ)− C
θ
≡ z∗o or zu ≥
θzo + C
1− θ ≡ z
∗
u. (6)
That is, if the expert must choose the treatment based on his prior belief about t, it is efficient
to choose TM if the harm from overtreatment is relatively small compared to undertreatment
(zo ≤ z∗o), and to choose Tm otherwise. Notice that z∗o , which is positive by the assumption on
C from part (ii) of (4), is increasing in zu and decreasing in C.
Incurring the diagnosis cost is efficient whenW (ET ) ≥ max {W (N,TM ), W (N,Tm)}, which
holds if and only if
k ≤ min{θ (C + zo) , (1− θ) (zu − C) , k¯} ≡ k∗ (zo, zu) , (7)
where we allow the possibility that k¯ may be below min {θ (C + zo) , (1− θ) (zu − C)} .
Lemma 1 summarizes the efficient benchmark.
Lemma 1 If the expert learns t upon seeing the consumer, it is efficient for him to choose Tt
for t = m,M. Otherwise, it is efficient to choose (i) (N,TM ) if k > k
∗ (zo, zu) and zo ≤ z∗o ; (ii)
(N,Tm) if k > k
∗ (zo, zu) and zo > z
∗
o ; (iii) ET if k ≤ k∗ (zo, zu).
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Thus, when additional diagnosis effort is required to learn t, the efficient decision by the
expert depends straightforwardly on the realized value of k and on the value of zo relative to
z∗o : When the diagnosis cost is sufficiently high, it is efficient to have TM without incurring k if
the loss from overtreatment is small enough, while it is efficient to have Tm without incurring
k if the loss from overtreatment is high enough; when the diagnosis cost is sufficiently low, it is
efficient to incur k and then choose the appropriate treatment. Notice that when k∗ (zo, zu) = k¯,
it is always efficient to incur the diagnosis cost.
3.2 Equilibrium of the Expert-Consumer Game
We now analyze the game between the expert and the consumer, taking the liability rule (D)
as given. Without loss of generality, denote any pair of prices by
PM = C +ΦM , Pm = Φm, (8)
where ΦM ≥ 0 and Φm ≥ 0 are the price margins or markups for the expert if he provides
treatments TM and Tm, respectively. Each pair of prices—or equivalently (ΦM ,Φm)—posted by
the consumer is followed by a treatment game between the expert and the consumer.
If the expert knows the realization of t, either upon seeing the consumer or after incurring
k, it would be optimal for him to choose Tt for t = m,M if and only if
ΦM ≥ Φm − αuDu, Φm ≥ ΦM − αoDo. (9)
Our analysis will proceed under the presumption that (9) holds—so that the expert will choose
the appropriate treatment if he knows what t is—and we later confirm that this is indeed the
case in equilibrium and a pair of prices that satisfy (9) is indeed optimal for the consumer.18
Notice that for (9) to hold, ΦM = Φm if Du = Do = 0. That is, in order for the expert to
recommend the appropriate treatment given his information, equal price margins from different
treatments are required when no liability can be imposed on the expert (e.g., Dulleck and Ker-
schbamer, 2006). When there are liabilities—as we allow in this paper—ΦM = Φm is sufficient
18For our purpose to find the efficient liability, it is without loss of generality to devote out attention to situations
where (9) is satisfied. If (9) is violated, the expert will have the perverse incentive to choose the “wrong”treatment
even when he knows t, which cannot be efficient.
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for (9) but no longer necessary: as long as the price margins for the two treatments are not too
different, the expert will have the right incentive to recommend the appropriate treatment if he
knows t. The presence of malpractice liability relaxes constraint (9).
Given (9), under which the expert will choose Tt for t ∈ {m,M} if he learns the realization
of t upon seeing the consumer, we can focus our analysis on three strategies that the expert can
choose from if he does not initially learn t: (i) (N,TM ): choosing TM without incurring k. (ii)
(N,Tm): choosing Tm without incurring k; and (iii) ET : incurring k, followed by the choices
of Tt for t = m,M. For a given D ≡ (Du,Do) and k, the expert’s profits under each of these
strategies are, respectively:
pi(N,TM ) = ΦM − θαoDo, pi(N,Tm) = Φm − (1− θ)αuDu, (10)
pi(ET ) = θΦm + (1− θ)ΦM − k, (11)
where θαoDo is the expert’s expected liability payment to the consumer under (N,TM ), since
overtreatment occurs with probability θ; and, similarly, (1 − θ)αuDu is the expert’s expected
liability payment to the consumer under (N,Tm). The expert will make his choice to maximize
his expected payoff; when he has the same expected payoff from any two options, we assume
that he will choose the option that is favorable to the consumer.
Our analysis in this section will impose the following minimum-price constraint:
pi(N,TM ) ≥ 0, pi(N,Tm) ≥ 0. (12)
When (12) is satisfied, ΦM and Φm are high enough so that the expert, whose outside option
is zero profit, will receive non-negative expected profit from providing each treatment under his
prior about t. This minimum price constraint may arise when both the expert and the consumer
have some bargaining power: the expert can insist on charging prices that would ensure non-
negative profit for offering each treatment under the prior belief, whereas the consumer can offer
prices subject to this constraint. Notice that under (12), the expert will receive strictly positive
profit when he is informed of t, and hence also strictly positive expected profit from market
participation. We shall say that there is unfettered competition between potential experts when
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(12) is not imposed, in which case prices will be set to maximize consumer surplus without any
constraint.19
Upon seeing the consumer, the expert either learns the realization of t and chooses Tt,
or, without learning t, he learns the realizations of his private diagnosis cost k and chooses
his action from {(N,TM ), (N,Tm), ET }.20 Thus, following a pair of prices Φ ≡ (ΦM ,Φm), the
expert’s optimal strategy when he does not initially learn t is ET if and only if pi(ET ) ≥
max{pi(N,TM ), pi(N,Tm)}, or if k is sufficiently small:
k ≤ min{θ (Φm − ΦM + αoDo) , (1− θ) (ΦM − Φm + αuDu)} ≡ kˆ(D,Φ). (13)
When k > kˆ(D,Φ), the expert prefers strategy (N,TM ) to strategy (N,Tm) if and only if
pi(N,TM )− pi(N,Tm) = ΦM − θαoDo − [Φm − (1− θ)αuDu] > 0. (14)
On the other hand, the consumer surplus from the three strategies are respectively
S(N,TM ) = θ [−zo − ΦM − C + αoDo] + (1− θ) [0− ΦM − C] , (15)
S(N,Tm) = θ [−Φm] + (1− θ) [−zu + αuDu − Φm] , (16)
S (ET ) = −θΦm − (1− θ) (ΦM + C) . (17)
Thus, consumer surplus is higher if Φm and ΦM are lower in each case. We also note that
S (ET )− S(N,TM ) = θ [ΦM − Φm + C + zo − αoDo] , (18)
S (ET )− S(N,Tm) = (1− θ) (Φm −ΦM − C + zu − αuDu) . (19)
We show below in the proof of Proposition 1 that the consumer’s optimal prices satisfy
ΦM − Φm = θαoDo − (1− θ)αuDu. (20)
19In Section 4, we examine the equilibrium outcome and optimal liability without (12), where we show that
there may exist no liability rule that ensures full efficiency.
20Condition (12) is important here, because if pi(N,TM ) < 0 or pi(N,Tm) < 0 (as we will allow in Section 4),
the expert may choose to forgo the consumer’s payment without treating her, if he finds that a high enough k is
required to diagonose the consumer’s problem. Condition (12) ensures that the expert will always be willing to
serve the consumer.
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Then, it follows from (18) and (19) that the consumer is willing to implement ET with a positive
probability—when the expert does not initially learn t and k is not too high— only if the total
expected liability payments are not too high:
αuDu + αoDo ≤ min
{
C + zo
1− θ ,
zu − C
θ
}
. (21)
Proposition 1 Suppose that (12) holds. In equilibrium, for any given D = (Du,Do) satisfying
(21), Φ = Φˆ =
(
ΦˆM , Φˆm
)
, where:
ΦˆM = θαoDo, and Φˆm = (1− θ)αuDu. (22)
If the expert learns t upon seeing the consumer, he will choose Tt. Otherwise, he will choose ET
when k ≤ kˆ
(
D, Φˆ
)
= θ(1− θ) (αuDu + αoDo) , whereas he will choose TM if zo < z∗o and Tm if
zo > z
∗
o when k > kˆ .
Proof. See Appendix A.
A few comments about the equilibrium are in order. First, in equilibrium the expert has the
same (zero) expected profit in treatments TM and Tm if he holds the prior belief about t. Notice
that this result is obtained under the assumption that the consumer makes price offers under
the constraint that the expert is able to earn a non-negative profit in each treatment under the
prior belief. As we show in section 4, without this constraint, the consumer may find it optimal
to offer prices that violate (12).
Second, unlike the result in the literature, in our model the two treatments need not have
equal price margins to induce the expert to choose the appropriate treatment when he knows the
realization of t. Rather, the two treatments need to have the same expected profit—given the
expected liability cost—under the expert’s prior belief about t. If margins differ so much that
they violate (9), then the expert may choose the wrong treatment when he has the information.
Moreover, if liability Du or Do is high enough so that (21) is violated, it might be to the
advantage of the consumer that the expert does not learn the realization of t and provides
the wrong treatment, in which case the consumer could collect the (excessively) high damage
payment. Thus, if the liability is not properly designed, the equilibrium incentive could be
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perverse. This situation will not arise if the liability satisfies (21), which also induces price
margins for the two treatments to be close enough to satisfy (9).
Third, for arbitrary liabilities (Do and Du) satisfying (21), while the equilibrium prices will
induce the expert to choose the efficient treatment given his information, kˆ(D, Φˆ) will generally
not equal to k∗(zo, zu). Therefore the equilibrium generally does not lead to the efficient diagnosis
effort choice.
3.3 Efficient Liability
Recall that under the equilibrium prices given in (22), inefficiency arises only when kˆ
(
D, Φˆ
)
6=
k∗ (zo, zu) , where
k∗ (zo, zu) = min
{
θ (C + zo) , (1− θ)(zu − C), k¯
}
,
with k∗ (zo, zu) = min
{
θ (C + zo) , k¯
}
if z ≤ z∗o and k∗ (zo, zu) = min
{
(1− θ)(zu − C), k¯
}
if z > z∗o . If the liability rule can ensure kˆ
(
D, Φˆ
)
= k∗ (zo, zu), the expert will choose the
diagnosis effort efficiently and the benchmark outcome as described in Lemma 1 is achieved.
Let D∗ = (D∗u, D
∗
o) be the efficient liability, and (ΦˆM , Φˆm) = (Φ
∗
M ,Φ
∗
m) be the the equilibrium
price margins under D∗.
Proposition 2 Suppose that (12) holds. Then, the following liability rule results in the efficient
outcome in equilibrium:
D∗u =
k∗ (zo, zu)
(1− θ)αu , D
∗
o =
k∗ (zo, zu)
θαo
. (23)
Proof. The liability rule under (23) satisfies (21), and hence in equilibrium the price margins sat-
isfy (22), with Φ∗M = Φ
∗
m = min
{
θ (C + zo) , k¯
}
if zo ≤ z∗o and Φ∗M = Φ∗m = min
{
(1− θ)(zu − C), k¯
}
if zo > z
∗
o . Moreover, under (D
∗
u,D
∗
o) ,
kˆ(D∗,Φ∗) = θ(1− θ) (αuD∗u + αoD∗o)
= θ(1− θ)
(
αu
k∗ (zo, zu)
(1− θ)αu + αo
k∗ (zo, zu)
θαo
)
= k∗ (zo, zu) .
Thus, efficiency is achieved in equilibrium.
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Notice that with the liability rule that implements the efficient outcome, the equilibrium
price margin for each treatment is equal to the efficient critical k, k∗(zo, zu). Thus, while there
exist a range of liabilities that would induce the equilibrium markups given in (22) for the two
treatments and these markups generally differ, they are the same under the efficient liability.
Intuitively, the equilibrium price margin is equal to the expert’s expected liability cost for each
treatment when he chooses the treatment without knowing t. By selecting D∗ that equates this
liability cost to the efficient k∗, the efficient liability incentivizes the expert to fully internalize
the social benefit from choosing the efficient diagnosis effort.
Also notice that the efficient liability depends on F (·) only through k¯, and is otherwise
invariant with respect to the form of F (·) . When k¯ < min {θ (C + zo) , (1− θ)(zu −C)} , it is
always efficient for the expert to incur the diagnosis cost. The efficient liability in this case is
D∗u =
k¯
(1− θ)αu , and D
∗
o =
k¯
θαo
,
both of which increase in k¯, with D∗u → 0 and D∗o → 0 when k¯ → 0. Intuitively, imposing
a liability has a cost to the consumer, because the price for the expert’s service will have to
increase to cover the expected liability cost. Hence, when the expert can learn the nature of the
problem with little additional diagnosis cost, the efficient liability also goes to zero.
The efficient liability can be expressed as a multiplier of the loss from undertreatment or
overtreatment: Du = γuzu and Do = γozo, where
γu =
k∗ (zo, zu)
(1− θ)αuzu , γo =
k∗ (zo, zu)
θαozo
. (24)
Notice that when k¯ → 0, both γu → 0 and γo → 0, while it’s also possible that γu > 1 or
γo > 1 (i.e., there can be punitive damages). Moreover, under the efficient liability, as the loss
from overtreatment becomes more likely to be verified relative to the loss from undertreatment,
the penalty for undertreatment will increase (in the sense that γu becomes higher relative to
γo). However, since in general γu 6= γo, if the liability multipliers are constrained to be the
same—say, γ—for both types of losses, the market outcome will generally be inefficient.
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4. Relaxing the Minimum Price Constraint
We now analyze the model without imposing minimum price constraint (12). To focus on the
more interesting cases, we assume21
k∗ = min{θ(C + zo), (1 − θ)(zu − C), k¯} = min {θ(C + zo), (1 − θ)(zu − C)} < k¯ <∞.
From Proposition 2, efficiency can be achieved when ΦM ≥ θαoDo and Φm ≥ (1 − θ)αuDu.
Hence, in this section we shall consider situations where at least one of these two inequalities
may be reversed in equilibrium (with Do > 0 or/and Du > 0).
If ΦM < θαoDo or Φm < (1 − θ)αuDu, the expert may earn negative expected profit when
choosing TM or Tm based on prior belief about t, in which case the expert may choose not
to treat the consumer if the diagnosis cost (k) is high. Thus, when (12) is not required, the
market outcome may depend on whether or not the expert has the obligation to serve after
seeing the consumer. Below, we examine in turn the two cases where, after seeing the consumer,
the expert has no obligation to serve or where he is obligated to serve. We will characterize
the optimal—i.e., welfare-maximizing—liability and investigate whether/when it achieves the
efficient outcome. We shall continue to assume that the liability and prices satisfy (9) and (21),
which will be shown to hold in equilibrium.
4.1 No Obligation to Serve
We first consider the case where the expert can choose not to serve the consumer if, after seeing
the consumer, he finds that his expected profit from service is negative.
Suppose that zo < z
∗
o , so that k
∗ = θ (C + zo) and W (N,TM ) > W (N,Tm).
22 The expert
exerts effort in information acquisition if and only if
pi(ET ) ≥ max{0, pi(N,TM ), pi(N,Tm)}.
Then, it can be easily verified that the relevant equilibrium prices involve either (i) ΦM = θαoDo
21If k∗ = k¯, it would be efficient for the expert to choose e = E for any realization of k when additional effort is
required to diagnose the consumer’s problem. Then, any wrong treatment is a sign of inefficient diagnosis effort,
and the efficient outcome can be achieved with sufficiently large (Do, Du).
22The analysis for the case where zo > z
∗
o is analogous and is briefly discussed later.
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and Φm ≤ (1 − θ)αuDu, with the expert selecting TM if he chooses between TM and Tm based
on prior belief about t; or (ii) ΦM < θαoDo and Φm < (1− θ)αuDu.23 Under case (i) and with
(21), from (15) and (17):
S (ET )− S(N,TM ) = θ [ΦM − Φm + C + zo − αoDo]
≥ θ [−(1− θ)αuDu + C + zo− (1− θ)αoDo] ≥ 0,
and under case (ii), the expert provides a treatment only if he knows t (either initially or by
incurring k) and never selects TM or Tm based on prior belief about t. Under each of the two
cases, the expert exerts diagnosis effort if and only if k does not exceed kˆ = θΦm + (1− θ) ΦM .
Therefore, with 0 ≤ Φm ≤ (1 − θ)αuDu, the consumer’s surplus under zo < z∗o and no
obligation to serve is:
Sa (ΦM ,Φm) =


βS (ET ) + (1− β)S (N,TM ) + (1− β)F
(
kˆ
)
[S (ET )− S (N,TM )] if ΦM = θαoDo
βS (ET ) + (1− β) (−x) + (1− β)F
(
kˆ
)
[S (ET )− (−x)] if ΦM < θαoDo
,
where
kˆ = θΦm + (1− θ)ΦM ≤ θ(1− θ)αuDu + (1− θ) θαoDo ≤ θ (C + zo) .
Notice that Sa (ΦM ,Φm) is continuous in Φm and upper semi-continuous in ΦM , having the
only potential discontinuous point at ΦM = θαoDo. Thus there exists some
(ΦaM ,Φ
a
m) = argmax ΦM∈[0,θαoDo],
Φm∈[0,(1−θ)αuDu]
Sa (ΦM ,Φm) . (25)
Proposition 3 Suppose zo < z
∗
o . Then, for given (Do,Du) satisfying (21), (ΦM ,Φm) = (Φ
a
M ,Φ
a
m)
in equilibrium. Moreover, given other parameter values, there exist xa > 0 and βa < 1 such that:
(i) if x > xa, then Do =
C+zo
(1−θ)αo
and Du = 0 induce the efficient outcome, with Φ
a
M =
θ(C+zo)
1−θ
and Φam = 0; (ii) if β > β
a, there exists no (Do,Du) that can lead to full efficiency.
Proof. See Appendix A.
23The third possiblity is ΦM < θαoDo and Φm = (1 − θ)αuDu, in which the expert would choose Tm if he
treats the consumer based on prior belief. Under (21) and zo < z
∗
o , one can verify that S (N,TM ) > S (N,Tm) ,
so that the consumer will prefer ΦM = θαoDo and Φm < (1− θ)αuDu to ΦM < θαoDo and Φm ≥ (1− θ)αuDu.
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In part (i) of Proposition 3, when x is large enough, the consumer is always better off with
treatment TM based on prior belief than without treatment. Hence the consumer will offer
ΦM = θαoDo so that the expert will choose (N,TM ) in case he does not learn t initially and
k turns out to be too high, and she will offer Φm = 0 to minimize the expert’s rent in case he
learns t initially or by incurring k. If Do =
C+zo
(1−θ)αo
and Du = 0, then
kˆ = θΦam + (1− θ)ΦaM = (1− θ)
θ (C + zo)
1− θ = θ (C + zo) = k
∗,
so that the expert will incur diagnosis effort efficiently, and he will also report information
truthfully since (21) is satisfied.
To see the intuition for part (ii) of Proposition 3, notice that when the consumer can be
(partially) compensated for the loss associated with an inappropriate treatment, she does not
bear the full social cost of the loss. Hence, in order to reduce the expert’s information rent, the
consumer may want to lower the prices below the level that would induce the efficient effort and
satisfy the minimum-price constraint (12), and she will indeed do so when β is high so that the
expert will choose the appropriate treatment sufficiently often even without incurring k. Hence,
when β is sufficiently high, an efficient liability—one that will ensure kˆ = k∗—fails to exist.
Therefore, if competition between potential experts drives the price margins below Φˆ, equi-
librium need no longer be efficient, even when the liability rule is chosen optimally. The lower
price increases consumer surplus—the consumer can always offer the prices satisfying (12) but
chooses to offer lower prices—albeit at the expense of total welfare because the gain to the
consumer is less than the loss to the expert. This highlights the subtlety in the design of an
efficient liability: while liability is necessary to provide incentives for the expert to exert effort,
it also creates a divergence between the social and private costs of a loss to the consumer. Con-
sequently, if there is perfect competition in the expert market without any restriction on prices,
inefficiency may arise even under an optimally designed liability rule.
When zo > z
∗
o , a similar analysis can establish that there exist some x
b > 0 and βb < 1 such
that if x > xb, then Do = 0 and Du =
zu−C
θαu
induce the efficient outcome, with ΦbM = 0 and
Φbm =
(1−θ)(zu−C)
θ
; whereas if β > βb, no (Do,Du) can lead to full efficiency.
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4.2 With Obligation to Serve
Now suppose that the expert is obligated to serve after seeing the consumer, i.e., after seeing
the consumer, the expert cannot choose not to provide treatment by forgoing the payment. As
before, we assume that (Do,Du) and prices satisfy (21) and (9).
Given (Do,Du), the consumer chooses (Φm,ΦM ) to maximize her expected surplus, subject
to the constraint that the expert receives non-negative expected profit by agreeing to see the
consumer. The expert will incur k if and only if
pi(ET ) = θΦm + (1− θ)ΦM − k ≥ max{pi(N,TM ), pi(N,Tm)}, or equivalently
k ≤ kˆ(D,Φ) = min{θ(Φm − ΦM + αoDo), (1 − θ)(ΦM − Φm + αuDu)}.
The expert is willing to accept (Φm,ΦM ) if:
Π(D,Φ) =
(
β + (1− β)F (kˆ)
)
(θΦm + (1− θ)ΦM )− (1− β)
∫ kˆ
0
tdF (t)
+ (1− β)(1 − F (kˆ))max{ΦM − θαoDo,Φm − (1− θ)αuDu} ≥ 0.
Define
D∗o =
k∗
θαo
, D∗u =
k∗
(1− θ)αu ; (26)
Φ∗M = (1− β)
[
k∗ −
∫ k∗
0
F (t)dt
]
= Φ∗m. (27)
Notice that (D∗o ,D
∗
u) satisfy (21).
Proposition 4 Suppose that the expert is obligated to treat the consumer after seeing her. Then,
liability (26), under which the equilibrium prices satisfy (27), leads to full efficiency, where the
expert will agree to serve, exert diagnosis effort if and only if k ≤ k∗, and choose Tt whenever
t ∈ {m,M} is known to him.
Proof. First, from the proof of Proposition 1, the equilibrium prices (Φ∗M , Φ
∗
m) satisfy
Φ∗M − θαoDo = Φ∗m − (1− θ)αuDu.
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Thus, under (26), the expert will choose k efficiently:
kˆ(Φ∗m,Φ
∗
M ) = min{θ (Φ∗m − Φ∗M + αoDo) , (1 − θ) (Φ∗M − Φ∗m + αuDu)}
= θ(1− θ)(αoD∗o + αuD∗u) = k∗.
Next, with
pi(N,TM ) = Φ
∗
M − θαoD∗o = Φ∗m − (1− θ)αuD∗u = pi(N,Tm),
if k > k∗, the expert will choose (N,TM ) when zo ≤ z∗o and (N,Tm) when zo > z∗o . Moreover:
Π(D∗,Φ∗) = [β + (1− β)F (k∗)] {Φ∗M + θ [(1− θ)αuD∗u − θαoD∗o ]}
+ (1− β) [1− F (k∗)] (Φ∗M − θαoD∗o)− (1− β)
∫ k∗
0
tf(t)dt
= Φ∗M − θαoD∗o − (1− β)
∫ k∗
0
tf(t)dt+ [β + (1− β)F (k∗)] k∗
= Φ∗M − θαoD∗o + βk∗ + (1− β)
∫ k∗
0
F (t)dt = 0
if Φ∗M and Φ
∗
m satisfy
Φ∗M = θαoD
∗
o − βk∗ − (1− β)
∫ k∗
0
F (t)dt,
Φ∗m = (1− θ)αuD∗u − βk∗ − (1− β)
∫ k∗
0
F (t)dt,
which simplify to (27). Note that these prices are optimal for the consumer subject to Π(D,Φ) ≥
0,
kˆ = k∗ = (1− θ)Φ∗M + θΦ∗m = (1− β)
∫ k∗
0
[1− F (t)] dt ≥ 0,
and (Φ∗M ,Φ
∗
m) indeed satisfy (9). They are thus equilibrium prices.
Therefore, if the expert is obligated to serve after seeing the consumer, then there exists an
efficient liability that induces full efficiency under market equilibrium, even without imposing the
minimum price condition (12). In reality, the obligation to serve may be difficult to implement.
After an initial consultation, it would seem reasonable that the expert, without taking any
payment from the consumer, will have the right not to provide treatment. A dentist, for example,
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may simply refer a patient to a “specialist” after seeing her.
5. Conclusion
This paper has studied the design of efficient liability in expert markets. Our analysis shows that
a well designed liability rule, in combination with the equilibrium prices it induces, can achieve
the efficient outcome in a setting where the expert needs to be provided with proper incentives
both in exerting diagnosis effort and in recommending the appropriate treatment. This efficient
liability rule imposes penalty on the expert contingent on whether his “malpractice”involves
overtreatment or undertreatment and the size of the consumer loss. The penalty may be punitive,
in the sense it exceeds consumer’s loss, and is higher when the probability of detection for the
mistreatment is lower. We also find that increased competition in the expert market, in the sense
that it removes the minimum-price constraint, may reduce efficiency. The existence of an efficient
liability also depends on whether the expert is obligated to serve when the price constraint is
not imposed, as well as on the quality of signals generated from the expert’s diagnosis effort.
We have studied a stylized model. There are other factors that can potentially impact the
performance of expert markets. For example, in the context of repeat purchases, reputation
concerns can incentivize experts to exert efforts and behave honestly in serving consumers. But
reputation can be fragile, and a well-designed liability rule can achieve efficiency even when
reputation does not. It is also possible that the expert and the consumer will rely on private
contracts, instead of legal liability, for damage payments in the case of a consumer loss; but
private contracting can have high transaction costs and contract enforcement may still rely on
the legal system. On the other hand, the use of liability as an incentive device may involve
additional legal and transaction costs as well, which we have not accounted for in our analysis.
Moreover, the beneficial effect of liability on market efficiency relies on its proper design and a
well-functioning legal process, which may not always be the case in practice.
The difficulties in providing proper incentives to experts (such as physicians and dentists)
are well known. By showing how an efficient liability can be designed in a model of adverse
selection and moral hazard, this paper offers new insights on improving the performance of
expert markets.
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6. Appendices
Appendix A: Proofs for Propositions 1 and 3.
Proof of Proposition 1. We first show that the consumer’s optimal prices indeed satisfy
(20). Let pi(N,TM )− pi(N,Tm) = ∆. Then from (14),
ΦM − Φm = ∆+ θαoDo − (1− θ)αuDu. (28)
From (13), if the expert does not learn t upon seeing the consumer, he will choose to incur k if
and only if k does not exceed
kˆ(D,Φ) = min {θ (Φm − ΦM + αoDo) , (1− θ) (ΦM − Φm + αuDu)}
= min {θ [−∆+ (1− θ) (αoDo + αuDu)] , (1− θ) [∆ + θ (αoDo + αuDu)]}
=


θ [−∆+ (1− θ) (αoDo + αuDu)] if ∆ > 0
(1− θ) [∆ + θ (αoDo + αuDu)] if ∆ < 0
.
We show that (20) holds, or ∆ = 0, by demonstrating that the consumer can benefit from
deviating to different prices if ∆ 6= 0. When the expert does not learn t upon seeing the
consumer, there are two cases to consider:
Case 1: ∆ > 0. Then pi(N,TM ) > pi(N,Tm) and the expert would choose TM if he is not
initially informed about t and also does not incur k. From (18) and (28):
S (ET )− S(N,TM ) = θ [ΦM − Φm +C + zo − αoDo]
= θ [∆ + θαoDo − (1− θ)αuDu + C + zo − αoDo]
= θ [∆ + C + zo − (1− θ) (αuDu + αoDo)] > 0.
Thus the consumer prefers ET to (N,TM ). By reducing ΦM slightly, ∆ becomes smaller and
kˆ(D,Φ) will rise—so that the expert incurs k more often while (9) continues to hold—and the
consumer will also pay a lower expected price. Therefore this change increases the consumer’s
expected surplus. Thus, a pair of prices with ∆ > 0 is not optimal for the consumer.
Case 2: ∆ < 0. The expert would choose Tm if he is not initially informed about t and also
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does not incur k, and a similar argument shows
S (ET )− S(N,Tm) = (1− θ) (Φm − ΦM − C + zu − αuDu)
= (1− θ) [−∆+ zu − C − θ (αuDu + αoDo)] > 0,
and the consumer can increase her surplus by reducing Φm.
Moreover, if the expert learns t upon seeing the consumer, the reduction in ΦM or Φm always
increases consumer surplus given that (9) is satisfied. In this case, if ∆ 6= 0, consumer surplus
can be increased by reducing either ΦM or Φm. Thus (20) holds in equilibrium.
Next, under (12), the lowest prices that satisfy (20) are such that pi(N,TM ) = 0 and
pi(N,Tm) = 0. Hence, with ∆ = 0, since consumer surplus is higher when prices are lower,
(ΦˆM , Φˆm) in (22) are indeed the consumer’s optimal prices.
Since prices Φˆ satisfy (9), the expert will choose Tt for t = m,M whenever he learns t. Finally,
given Φˆ, the expert receives the same expected profit from choosing (N,TM ) and (N,Tm) . Under
(ΦˆM , Φˆm), from (15) and (16):
S (N,TM ) = −ΦˆM − C + θαoDo − θzo = −θαoDo − C + θαoDo − θzo = −C − θzo,
S (N,Tm) = −Φˆm + (1− θ)αuDu − (1− θ) zu = − (1− θ) zu.
Thus, under (21), the consumer will prefer (N,TM ) to (N,Tm) if zo < z
∗
o and prefer (N,Tm)
to (N,TM ) if zo > z
∗
o . Therefore, since by assumption the expert will choose the action desired
by the consumer when facing two actions that have the same expected payoff to him, the only
equilibrium when k > kˆ
(
D, Φˆ
)
is for the expert to choose TM if zo < z
∗
o and Tm if zo < z
∗
o .
Proof of Proposition 3. First, (ΦM ,Φm) = (Φ
a
M ,Φ
a
m) in equilibrium, following directly from
the definition of (25). We now proceed to prove (i) and (ii).
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(i) With S (ET ) = −θΦm − (1− θ) (ΦM + C) and [S (ET )− S (N,TM )] ≥ 0, we have
Sa(ΦM ,Φm) |ΦM=θαoDo= βS (ET ) + (1− β)S (N,TM ) + (1− β)F
(
kˆ
)
[S (ET )− S (N,TM )]
≥ βS (ET ) + (1− β)S (N,TM )
= β [−θ(1− θ)αuDu − (1− θ) θαoDo − (1− θ)C] + (1− β) (−θzo − C)
≥ β (−θ (C + zo)− (1− θ)C) + (1− β) (−θzo − C) = − (C + θzo) ,
where the last inequality obtains by using (21).
Next, with kˆ ≤ θ (C + zo), x ≥ (1− θ)C due to the assumption on C from part (i) of (4),
and S(ET ) < −(1− θ)C, we have
Sa(ΦM ,Φm) |ΦM<θαoDo= βS (ET ) + (1− β) (−x) + (1− β)F
(
kˆ
)
[S (ET )− (−x)]
≤ β (− (1− θ)C) + (1− β) (−x) + (1− β)F (θ (C + zo)) (− (1− θ)C − (−x))
= −β (1− θ)C − (1− β)x [1− F (θ (C + zo))]− (1− β)F (θ (C + zo)) (1− θ)C.
Thus
max
Φm
Sa (ΦM ,Φm)|ΦM=θαoDo − max(ΦM ,Φm) S
a (ΦM ,Φm)|ΦM<θαoDo
≥ − (C + θzo) + (1− θ)C [β + (1− β)F (θ (C + zo))] + (1− β)x [1− F (θ (C + zo))] ≥ 0
⇐⇒ x ≥ (C + θzo)− (1− θ)C [β + (1− β)F (θ (C + zo))]
(1− β) [1− F (θ (C + zo))] > 0.
Therefore ΦaM = θαoDo and Φ
a
m ∈ [0, (1 − θ)αuDu] if
x ≥ max
{
C + θzo,
(C + θzo)− (1− θ)C [β + (1− β)F (θ (C + zo))]
(1− β) [1− F (θ (C + zo))]
}
≡ xa.
Finally, under Do =
(C+zo)
(1−θ)αo
and Du = 0 we have Φ
a
M =
θ(C+zo)
1−θ and Φ
a
m = 0. Thus
kˆ = θΦam + (1− θ)ΦaM = (1− θ)
θ (C + zo)
1− θ = θ (C + zo) = k
∗.
Condition (21) is satisfied because αoDo+αuDu =
C+zo
(1−θ) , and (9) is also satisfied. Therefore,
the expert will choose Tt for t ∈ (m,M) when he knows t (either initially or by incurring k),
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and will also incur k efficiently.
(ii) First, recall
Sa(ΦM ,Φm) |ΦM<θαoDo= βS (Et) + (1− β) (−x) + (1− β)F
(
kˆ
)
[S (Et)− (−x)] ,
where S (ET ) = −θΦm − (1− θ) (ΦM + C) < − (1− θ)C and kˆ = θΦm + (1− θ) ΦM . Thus
∂Sa (ΦM ,Φm)|ΦM<θαoDo
∂ΦM
= β (− (1− θ)) + (1− β) f
(
kˆ
)
(1− θ) [S (Et)− (−x)] + (1− β)F
(
kˆ
)
(− (1− θ)) < 0
and
∂Sa (ΦM ,Φm)|ΦM<θαoDo
∂Φm
= β (−θ) + (1− β) f
(
kˆ
)
θ [S (Et)− (−x)] + (1− β)F
(
kˆ
)
(−θ) < 0
hold if (1− β) f
(
kˆ
)
[S (Et)− (−x)]− (1− β)F
(
kˆ
)
< β, which in turn holds if
β > arg max
k∈[0,k¯]
f (k) [x− (1− θ)C]−F (k)
1 + f (k) [x− (1− θ)C]−F (k) ≡ β
′,
where x > (1− θ)C and β′ < 1.
Then, if β > β′, for any D, there can be no equilibrium where ΦaM < θαoDo and kˆ =
θΦm + (1− θ) ΦM = θ (C + zo) = k∗. This is because if β > β′ and ΦaM < θαoDo, from
∂Sa(ΦM ,Φm)|ΦM<θαoDo
∂ΦM
< 0 and
∂Sa(ΦM ,Φm)|ΦM<θαoDo
∂Φm
< 0 we have ΦaM = Φ
a
m = 0, and hence
kˆ = 0 < k∗.
Next, we show that there exist some β′′ and βa = max
{
β′, β′′
}
< 1 such that if β > βa, there
can also be no equilibrium where ΦaM = θαoDo and kˆ = θΦm + (1− θ)ΦM = θ (C + zo) = k∗.
Suppose that, to the contrary, there is some Do for which Φ
a
M = θαoDo and kˆ = θΦm +
(1− θ) ΦM = θ (C + zo) = k∗. Then, when β > β′ ,
∂Sa (ΦM ,Φm)|ΦM=θαoDo
∂Φm
= β (−θ) + (1− β) θf
(
kˆ
)
[S (ET )− S (N,TM )] + (1− β) (−θ)F
(
kˆ
)
< β (−θ) + (1− β) θf
(
kˆ
)
[S (ET ) + x] + (1− β) (−θ)F
(
kˆ
)
< 0,
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and hence Φam = 0. It follows that in order for kˆ = θΦm + (1− θ) ΦM = θ (C + zo) = k∗, we
have (1− θ) θαoDo = θ (C + zo) and
max
ΦM ,Φm
Sa (ΦM ,Φm)|ΦM=θαoDo = Sa (θαoDo, 0)
= β [− (1− θ) (θαoDo + C)] + (1− β) [−C − θzo] + (1− β)F
(
kˆ
)
[− (1− θ) (θαoDo + C) + C + θzo]
= β [−θ (C + zo)− (1− θ)C] + (1− β) [−C − θzo] + (1− β)F
(
kˆ
)
[−θ (C + zo)− (1− θ)C + C + θzo]
= β [−θzo − C] + (1− β) [−C − θzo] + (1− β)F
(
kˆ
)
[−θzo − C +C + θzo] = − (C + θzo) .
But if β > β′, for any D,
max
ΦM ,Φm
Sa (ΦM ,Φm)|ΦM<θαoDo = Sa (0, 0) = β [− (1− θ)C] + (1− β) (−x) .
Thus, for (1− θ) θαoDo = θ (C + zo) ,
max
ΦM ,Φm
Sa(ΦM ,Φm) |ΦM<θαoDo − max
ΦM ,Φm
Sa(ΦM ,Φm) |ΦM=θαoDo
= −β [(1− θ)C]− (1− β) x+ (C + θzo)
= β [x− (1− θ)C]− x+ (C + θzo) > 0⇔ β > x− (C + θzo)
x− (1− θ)C ≡ β
′′,
where β′′ < 1. Then, if β > βa = max
{
β′, β′′
}
and Do =
(C+zo)
αo(1−θ)
, the consumer will optimally
offer ΦM = Φm = 0, resulting in kˆ = 0 < k
∗, which is a contradiction.
We have thus shown that if β > βa, there exists no D under which kˆ = k∗ in equilibrium.
Appendix B: Noisy Diagnosis
We extend our main model and its analysis in the direction of imperfect diagnosis. Specifi-
cally, in the event that the expert does not learn t upon seeing the consumer, he can privately
observe only a noisy signal s ∈ {sm, sM} about t by incurring the private diagnosis cost k. The
signal is correct with probability σ about the true consumer type, that is:
Pr(sm| t = m) = σ = Pr{sM | t =M}, Pr(sm| t =M) = 1− σ = Pr{sM | t = m}.
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We assume
σ > σ ≡ max {(1− θ)(zu − C), θ(C + zo)}
(1− θ)(zu − C) + θ(C + zo) ≥
1
2
(30)
so that the signal is informative and there exist parameter values under which it is efficient for
the expert to exert diagnosis effort.24 We further assume θ > 12 so that the consumer’s problem
is more likely to be minor.25 Everything else remains the same as in the main model in Section
3. In particular, we impose the minimum-price constraint (12).
Note that the total surpluses from strategies (N,TM ) and (N,Tm) are not affected by the
noisy signal. The total surplus from strategy ET—exerting diagnosis effort and recommending
Tt if signal st is received—is
W (ET ) = θ [(1− σ) (−C − zo)] + (1− θ) [−σC − (1− σ) zu]− k
= θσ(zo + C)− (1− θ)(1 − σ)(zu − C)− C − θzo − k.
Exerting effort is efficient when W (ET ) ≥ max {W (N,TM ),W (N,Tm)} , which holds if
k ≤ min

 θσ (C + zo)− (1− θ) (1− σ) (zu − C) ,
(1− θ) σ (zu − C)− θ (1− σ) (C + zo) , k¯

 ≡ k∗∗ (zo, zu) . (31)
For σ < 1, k∗∗ (zo, zu) < k
∗(zo, zu). Imperfect diagnosis reduces the critical value of diagnosis
cost. Assumption (30) ensures k∗∗(zo, zu) > 0 so that if k < k
∗∗(zo, zu) it is efficient for the
expert to acquire the signal.
Lemma 2 summarizes the first-best outcome when diagnosis is imperfect.
Lemma 2 With noisy diagnosis, if the expert learns t upon seeing the consumer, it is efficient
for him to choose Tt for t = m,M . Otherwise: (i) If k > k
∗∗ (zo, zu) and zo ≤ z∗o , it is efficient
to choose (N,TM ); (ii) If k > k
∗∗ (zo, zu) and zo ≥ z∗o , it is efficient to choose (N,Tm); (iii) If
k ≤ k∗∗ (zo, zu), it is efficient to choose ET and follow the signal (i.e., choosing Tt if signal st is
received).
Given a pair of prices Φ = (ΦM ,Φm), the expert’s profit from strategies (N,TM ) and (N,Tm)
24If σ ≤ σ, it would not be efficient for the expert to exert diagnosis effort. In this case, equal price margins
for the two treatments would lead to the efficient outcome.
25The analysis for the case with θ ≤ 1
2
is analogous to θ > 1
2
.
27
are the same as in the main model, but the profit from ET becomes:
pi(ET ) = θ [σΦm + (1− σ)(ΦM − αoDo)] + (1− θ) [σΦM + (1− σ)(Φm − αuDu)]− k.
The expert’s optimal strategy is ET if and only if pi(ET ) ≥ max{pi(N,TM ), pi(N,Tm)}, or equiv-
alently if and only if k is sufficiently small:
k ≤ min


[θσ + (1− θ)(1− σ)] (Φm − ΦM ) + θσαoDo − (1− θ)(1− σ)αuDu,
[θ(1− σ) + (1− θ)σ] (ΦM − Φm)− θ(1− σ)αoDo + (1− θ)σαuDu


≡ k˜(D,Φ). (32)
If the expert needs to incur k, it would be optimal for him to follow signal st if and only if
the prices (ΦM ,Φm) satisfy
ΦM − (1− σ)αoDo ≥ Φm − σαuDu, Φm − (1− σ)αuDu ≥ ΦM − σαoDo. (33)
Note that if a pair of prices (ΦM ,Φm) satisfy (33), they also satisfy constraint (9) so that the
expert reports truthfully if he learns the consumer’s type t without incurring k. Let pi(N,TM )−
pi(N,Tm) = ∆. Then using (14), we have
ΦM − Φm = ∆+ θαoDo − (1− θ)αuDu. (34)
Condition (33) is then equivalent to
(1− σ − θ)(αoDo + αuDu) ≤ ∆ ≤ (σ − θ)(αoDo + αuDu). (35)
Proposition 5 below characterizes the liability rules that implement the efficient outcome as
described in Lemma 2. Whether or not efficiency can be implemented depends on the precision
of the expert’s noisy signal.
Proposition 5 (i) If σ ≥ max{θ, σ}, the following liability rule results in the efficient outcome
in equilibrium:
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D˜u =
k∗∗ (zo, zu)
(1− θ) (2σ − 1)αu , D˜o =
k∗∗ (zo, zu)
θ (2σ − 1)αo . (36)
(ii) If max{σ˜, σ} < σ < θ, where σ˜ ≡ θ−
√
θ−θ2
2θ−1 , the efficient outcome is achieved with liability
rule
D¯o =
k∗∗(zo, zu)
2αo [(1− θ)σ2 − θ(1− σ)2] , D¯u =
k∗∗(zo, zu)
2αu [(1− θ)σ2 − θ(1− σ)2] (37)
(iii) If σ < σ ≤ σ˜, the efficient outcome cannot be achieved in equilibrium.
Proof. Replacing ΦM − Φm in (32) by (34), we have
k˜(D,Φ) = min


− (θσ + (1− θ)(1− σ))∆ + θ(1− θ) (2σ − 1) (αoDo + αuDu) ,
(θ(1− σ) + (1− θ)σ)∆ + θ(1− θ) (2σ − 1) (αoDo + αuDu)


=


− (θσ + (1− θ)(1 − σ))∆ + θ(1− θ) (2σ − 1) (αoDo + αuDu) if ∆ > 0
(θ(1− σ) + (1− θ)σ)∆ + θ(1− θ) (2σ − 1) (αoDo + αuDu) if ∆ < 0
.
Note that k˜(D,Φ) is maximized if ∆ = 0. The consumer surplus from the three strategies,
(N,TM ), (N,Tm) and ET are respectively:
S(N,TM ) = θ [−zo − ΦM − C + αoDo] + (1− θ) [−ΦM − C] ,
S(N,Tm) = −θΦm + (1− θ) [−zu − Φm + αuDu] ,
S (ET ) = −θ [σΦm + (1 − σ)(ΦM + C − αoDo)]
− (1− θ) [σ (ΦM + C) + (1− σ)(Φm − αuDu)] .
(i) σ ≥ max{θ, σ}. To satisfy (35), ∆ can be either positive or negative. We show that ∆ = 0
is optimal for the consumer in this case.
If ∆ > 0, pi(N,TM ) > pi(N,Tm), the expert would choose TM if he is not initially informed
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about t and also does not incur k. Note that the consumer surplus
S (ET )− S(N,TM )
= θ [σ (ΦM − Φm + C − αoDo) + zo] + (1− θ) (1− σ) [(ΦM + C)− (Φm − αuDu)]
= θ [σ (∆ + C − (1− θ) (αuDu + αoDo)) + zo]
+ (1− θ) (1− σ) [∆ + C + θ (αoDo + αuDu)]
= θσ (∆ +C) + (1− θ) (1− σ) (∆ + C) + θzo − θ (1− θ) (2σ − 1) (αoDo + αuDu) .
With the given liabilities (D˜o, D˜u), θ (1− θ) (2σ − 1)
(
αoD˜o + αuD˜u
)
= k∗∗, therefore,
S (ET )− S(N,TM ) = θσ (∆ + C) + (1− θ) (1− σ) (∆ + C) + θzo − k∗∗
≥ θσ (∆ + C) + (1− θ) (1− σ) (∆ + C) + θzo − (θσ(C + zo)− (1− θ)(1− σ)(zu − C))
= θσ∆+ (1− θ) (1− σ)∆ + (1− θ)(1− σ)zu > 0
Thus, the consumer prefers ET to (N,TM ). By reducing ΦM (thus reducing ∆), k˜(D˜,Φ) will
rise and the expert incurs the diagnosis cost more often and the consumer pays a lower price.
In the case that the expert learns t immediately without diagnosis effort, keeping everything
else the same, ∆ = 0 implies a lower price for the consumer than ∆ > 0. Thus, if ∆ > 0, it is
optimal for the consumer to reduce ∆ by reducing ΦM .
Similarly, one can show that given D˜, ∆ < 0 is not optimal for the consumer either. As
a result, an optimal price must satisfy ∆ = 0. Further note that a pair of prices such that
pi(N,TM ) = pi(N,Tm) = 0 satisfy ∆ = 0 and at the same time are the lowest possible prices
that guarantee (12), therefore, the consumer’s optimal price must be
ΦˆM = θαoD˜o, Φˆm = (1− θ)αuD˜u. (38)
From (32), using the optimal prices (38), the expert incurs k if and only if k ≤ k˜
(
D˜, Φˆ
)
=
θ(1 − θ) (2σ − 1)
(
αuD˜u + αoD˜o
)
= k∗∗. Thus, the efficient outcome is indeed achieved with
liability (D˜o, D˜u).
(ii) If θ > σ, max{σ˜, σ} < σ < θ is a non-empty interval because θ > σ˜ = θ−
√
θ−θ2
2θ−1 for θ >
1
2 .
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Since σ < θ, satisfying (35) requires ∆ < 0. From (32), we get
k˜(D,Φ) = (θ(1− σ) + (1− θ)σ)∆ + θ(1− θ) (2σ − 1) (αoDo + αuDu) .
Note that k˜(D,Φ) increases in ∆. Following the same procedure in part (i), one can show that
given (D¯o, D¯u), S(ET )− S(N,Tm) > 0 and the largest ∆ is optimal for the consumer, that is
∆∗(Do,Du) = (σ − θ)(αoDo + αuDu).
Accounting for constraint (12), the equilibrium prices must be
Φ¯M = θαoD¯o, Φ¯m = (1− σ)αuD¯u + (θ − σ)αoD¯o.
Then, the expert exerts diagnosis effort if and only if k does not exceed
k¯
(
D¯, Φ¯
)
= (θ(1− σ) + (1− θ)σ)∆∗(D¯o, D¯u) + θ(1− θ) (2σ − 1)
(
αoD¯o + αuD¯u
)
=
[
(1− θ)σ2 − θ(1− σ)2] (αoD¯o + αuD¯u) = k∗∗.
Thus, liability rule (D¯o, D¯u) indeed implements the efficient outcome.
(iii) If σ˜ > σ, σ < σ ≤ σ˜ is a non-empty interval. Note that σ ≤ σ˜ = θ−
√
θ−θ2
2θ−1 is equivalent
to σ2(1− θ)− θ(1−σ)2 ≤ 0. For any pair of prices that satisfy (35), the expert exerts diagnosis
effort if k does not exceed
k˜(D,Φ) = [θ(1− σ) + (1− θ)σ] ∆ + θ(1− θ) (2σ − 1) (αoDo + αuDu)
≤ [σ2(1− θ)− θ(1− σ)2] (αoDo + αuDu) ≤ 0,
where the first inequality is obtained by replacing ∆ with its upper bound (σ−θ)(αoDo+αuDu)
in (35). Thus, there exists no liability rule under which the equilibrium prices will ensure the
efficient outcome with honest reporting and efficient effort by the expert.
Thus, the efficient outcome can be implemented if σ is sufficiently large, that is, σ >
max{σ˜, σ}. Because of constraint (35), the liability rules that implement efficiency differ when
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σ ≥ max{θ, σ} or max{σ˜, σ} < σ < θ. But if σ is below the threshold, σ˜, efficiency cannot be
implemented.
Intuitively, when σ ≥ max{θ, σ}, ∆ = 0 maximizes k˜(D,Φ) and is also a feature of the
equilibrium price. The analysis is thus similar to that in the main model where the signal
is perfect (σ = 1). As in the main model, the markups for the two treatments are equal in
equilibrium under the efficient liability rule.
When max{σ˜, σ} < σ < θ, ∆ < 0 in order for the truthful reporting incentive (35) to hold.
In this case, the equilibrium prices for a given liability rule (Do,Du) are
Φ¯M = θαoDo, Φ¯m = (1− σ)αuDu + (θ − σ)αoDo.
At the efficient liability rule (D¯o, D¯u), we notice that Φ¯M 6= Φ¯m. Thus, when the expert’s
diagnosis only leads to a noisy signal about the consumer’s problem, the equilibrium markups
for the two treatments may not be equal at the efficient liability rule.
Finally, when σ ≤ σ˜, σ2(1− θ)− θ(1− σ)2 < 0. Given a pair of prices that satisfy (35) and
the upper bound of ∆ in (35), the expert would exert diagnosis effort only if k is below
k˜(D,Φ) < (σ2(1− θ)− θ(1− σ)2)(αoDo + αuDu) ≤ 0.
Therefore, there is no liability rule that could induce the expert to report his information truth-
fully and also to incur any positive diagnosis cost. In other words, when the signal is not
informative enough, even though it is still welfare-improving to acquire the signal, eliciting
truthful reporting of information from the expert requires unbalanced markups (∆ < 0) for the
two treatments, which in turn squeezes out the expert’s information acquisition incentive.
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